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ABORTION IN PERSPECTIVE
ROBERT M. BYRN*
"The right to life is one of the fundamental values on which
Western society has been built." ST JOHN-STEvAS, THE RIGHT
TO LIFE 115 (1963)
The abortion controversy is assuming national proportions. The Asso-
ciation for the Study of Abortion, a nationwide organization dedicated
to a liberalization of the law, has enlisted a cadre of speakers "to edu-
cate the public to reform."' The Association seems to be politically as
well as pedagogically oriented. One of its spokesmen recently hailed an
abortion liberalization bill, introduced at the 1966 session of the New
York State Legislature,2 as a "rallying point for reform forces in the
state."' The abortion debate is already in vigorous progress in several
states, including Pennsylvania and New York, but these states are not
unique. Before long, the entire country will be involved.
What are the issues in the abortion debate? To date, much of what we
know has come from the mass media. Consequently, some of the issues,
which lawyers might conceive to be vital, have been shunted aside in
favor of more commercially exploitable material. Even the legal writing
on the subject is frequently tinged with sensationalism and ad religionem
distortions. As a result, if the Bar is to play a meaningful role in the
expanding debate, the issues must be reframed within a legal context. I
believe that the questions that follow are those which lawyers will par-
ticularly want answered. In each case, an answer has been suggested.
THE NATURE OF ABORTION
What Is an Abortion?
Abortion is the "expulsion of the fetus from the uterus before the de-
veloping human organism can lead an independent existence."4 An inten-
* B.S., LL.B., Fordham University; Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law.
1. LADER, ABORTION 148 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LADER].
2. Sen. Intro. No. 2003, Pr. No. 2056, Ass. Intro. No. 3844, Pr. No. 3931, N. Y. Stat.
Leg. 189th Sess. (1966).
3. LADER 146.
4. Rosen, Abortion, Today's Health p. 24 (April, 1965). Ordinarily, the fetus is capable
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tional interruption of the pregnancy is kown as an "induced abortion."
If the abortion has not been induced, it is known as a "spontaneous abor-
tion," that which we commonly call a miscarriage.' In this article, the
word abortion refers to an induced abortion.
An abortion kills something. The "developing human organism," which
was alive and growing before the interruption of the pregnancy, is dead
after it.
Does an Abortion Destroy a Human Life?
Medical science, clinical medicine, and the law now recognize that the
fetus is a human being from the moment of conception.
The history of medical science is replete with theories which deny the
independent humanity of the fetus, at least during the early stages of its
existence in the womb. In Roman law, the fetus was treated as a part of
the mother, "as the fruit is a part of the tree till it becomes ripe and falls
down."6 Hence, it was no more an independent human being than a tumor
growing within the mother.
Aristotle hypothesized three successive states of the fetus. At concep-
tion, the fetus (or embryo) is a vegetable; later in the gestation period,
it becomes animal, and finally, at a subsequent point in time during the
pregnancy, it achieves humanity. The Aristotelean hypothesis found
favor among early Christian theologians and scientists, and as modified
by Thomas Aquinas, it provided the foundation for the original common
law concept that human life begins with "quickening," that is, with an
intrauterine movement by the fetus which is actually felt by the preg-
nant woman.7
During the nineteenth century, some embryologists speculated that the
fetus in utero imitates the evolution of mankind. Until this evolutionary
process is complete, the fetus remains in a sub-human state.'
Most recently, the fetus has been characterized as an "inchoate being"
which, presumably, is something less than a human being.'
of independent existence, that is, it becomes "viable," after twenty-four to twenty-eight
weeks of pregnancy. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, comment, p. 148 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
5. Rosen, supra note 4, at 24.
6. Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 MODERN L. REV. 126, 131 (1938).
7. For more extensive discussions tracing the history and influence of the Aristotelean
theory, see Quay, Justifiable Abortion: Medical and Legal Foundations-Part 11, 49 GEO.
L.J. 395, 426-31 (1961); WmUaLms, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CaRmimAL LAW 148-52
(1957). Ordinarily, the fetus "quickens" between the fourteenth and twentieth weeks of
pregnancy. MODE PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 148.
8. See Means, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1965, p. 28, col. 4.
9. MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 149.
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In view of all these theories, one might argue that an abortion does
not kill a human being since that which dies is, alternatively, a part of
the mother, a vegetable, a sub-human phenomenon, or an inchoate being.
The argument must fail, however, because none of the supporting theories
survives modern scientific scrutiny.
The Romans were wrong in thinking that the fetus is part of the
mother. Embryologists now know that the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum "initiates the life of a new individual."' ° This new in-
dividual develops, not in the distinct stages envisioned by Aristotle, but
in a gradual and purposeful manner which might be compared to the
gradual growth of the child after birth. Accordingly, the pre-natal period
is now regarded as a part of the total lifetime of the individual. "[B] irth
is but a convenient landmark in a continuous process ... ""
This new individual, whose lifetime begins with conception, is neither
an Aristotelean vegetable nor a pioneer embryologist's sub-human phe-
nomenon; for not only does the fetus achieve individuality at conception,
but it also becomes "a unique personality."12 Conception generates such
peculiarly human, and distinctively personal characteristics as, among
others, ultimate intelligence, body height, blood group, and color of hair,
skin, and eyes.' Some of these, such as blood group, remain absolutely
fixed while others, such as ultimate height, may be modified to some de-
gree, by environmental factors. 4 A similar modification may also occur
after birth. For instance, just as the ultimate intelligence of the child may
be affected by a disease contracted by his mother before his birth, so too
may his intelligence be altered by an unfavorable social environment
during his formative years. 5 The result in either case is recognized as a
modification of a particular human and personal characteristic. It is not
a transmutation from sub-humanity to humanity. 6
Finally, this new individual, this unique personality, cannot be denied
his status as a human being on the ground that he is "inchoate." In the
words of the late Dr. A. C. Mietus, an eminent teacher of obstetrics and
gynecology, "The embryo or fetus may be 'inchoate' but it is indisputably
complete and integrated in terms of its essential elements; it requires
10. PATTEN, FOUNDATIONS OF EMBRYOLOGY 3 (2d ed. 1964); accord, MARSHALL, MEDICINE
AND MORALS 20 (paperback ed. 1964).
11. PATTEN, op cit. supra note 10, at 3.
12. Ratner, Is It a Person or a Thing?, Report p. 20, 21 (April, 1966).
13. Id. at 21; MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 20.
14. MARSHALL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 20.
15. Goldman, 5,600,000 of Us are Mentally Retarded, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1964, § 6
(Magazine), p. 31, 94.
16. For instance, one geneticist refers to the effect on "children before birth" of German
measles contracted by the child's mother early in the pregnancy. ASHLEY MONTAGU, LIFE
BEFORE BIRTH 135 (1964). The child remains a child even though one or more of the char-
acteristics which make him a unique human being may have been modified.
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nothing but food to grow. In terms of ultimate full development to ma-
turity, the infant after birth is comparably an inchoate creature."' 7
As Dr. Mietus has indicated, "inchoate" in this context means nothing
more than immature. During the continuous life process that begins at
conception, passes through the convenient landmark of birth, and ends
at death, all human beings remain inchoate until they reach full maturity.
In this respect, the post-natal, pre-puberty child might also be called
inchoate. Still, he is neither more nor less human than his pre-natal
brother or his adult sister.
In the eyes of medical science, the lifetime of every human being be-
gins at conception. Before death the individual encounters many land-
marks-birth, puberty, and so forth-but none of these add qualitatively
to the distinctive humanity that is achieved when the sperm fertilizes the
ovum. An eminent scientist summed it up best when he described the
fetus in this way: "In spite of his newness and his appearance, he is a
living, striving human being from the very beginning."'
Certainly clinical medicine is alert to the findings of medical science.
Doctor Herbert Ratner, the Director of Public Health of the Village of
Oak Park, Illinois, and a teacher of preventive medicine, has observed,
"[A] physician . . .relying solely on medical science, knows, when he
performs an abortion, that he is killing another human being."' 9 Lest a
physician be tempted to treat human life lightly, the International Code
of Medical Ethics, adopted in 1949 by the Third General Assembly of
the World Medical Association (comprising thirty-nine national medical
societies) reminds him that, "A doctor must always bear in mind the im-
portance of preserving human life from the moment of conception until
death."2 Thus, the ethics of the medical profession require a physician,
who attends a pregnancy, to care for the lives of two human beings-the
mother and the unborn child.
With the exception of the abortion movement, the universal trend in
the law is toward full recognition of the humanity of the unborn child. 2'
This trend is particularly apparent in the law of torts. It has been held
in both Pennsylvania and New York, that a child may -maintain a tort
action after birth to recover for pre-natal injuries, even though he suf-
fered the injuries at a very early stage in his mother's pregnancy.2 2 In
17. A. C. Mietus and Norbert J. Mietus, Criminal Abortion: "A Failure of Law" or a
Challenge to Society?, 51 A.B.A.J. 924, 925 (1965).
18. AsmLEy MONTAGU, op. cit. supra note 16, at 2.
19. Ratner, supra note 12, at 21.
20. Taylor, A Lawyer Reviews Plan for Legalized Abortion, 26 LINAC E Q. 137 (1959).
21. See Byrne, The Rights of the Unborn Child, 41 LA. BAR BULL. 24 (1965).
22. See respectively Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (injury suffered
in the first month of pregnacy); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696
(3d Dept. 1953) (injury suffered in the third month of pregnancy). Neither Pennsylvania
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arriving at this conclusion, the Pennsylvania court in Sinkler v. Kneale2"
quoted with approval this language from a New Jersey decision, "Medi-
cal authorities have long recognized that a child is in existence from the
moment of conception . "...24 (Emphasis supplied.) Also relying on
medical science, the New York court in Kelly v. Gregory25 held, "The
complaint here, in alleging that plaintiff was in being in the third month
of his mother's pregnancy alleges a conclusion of fact consistent with
generally accepted knowledge of the process [of conception] ." (Emphasis
supplied.) In short, the fetus is a human being, a child, from the moment
of conception.
Whether we look for guidance to (a) the discoveries of science, (b) the
ethics of medicine, or (c) the trends in the law, we are led inevitably to
the conclusion that an abortion at any stage of the pregnancy destroys
the life of a human being.
Is Abortion Qualitatively Different From Contraception?
In late 1963, Doctor Robert Hall, who was later to become the presi-
dent of the Association for the Study of Abortion,26 wrote "[B]irth con-
trol in its broadest sense includes contraception, sterilization and abor-
tion, none of which will suffice alone."2
Through 1963, the Planned Parenthood pamphlet, Plan Your Children,
contained the statement, "An abortion requires an operation. It kills the
life of a baby after it has begun .... Birth control merely postpones the
beginning of life."2 Inexplicably, this statement was deleted from the
1964 revision of the pamphlet.2" Whatever the reason for the deletion
may have been, the statement in the 1963 edition remains accurate. As
explained in an article on child care in a national magazine, "The peri-
natal period can be considered the first year of life-the period from
nor New York permits a wrongful death action in the case of a stillbirth. These holdings
are not intended as a denial of the humanity of the unborn child; they merely reflect the
impracticalities inherent in any such action. For instance, it would be almost impossible to
compute damages with any reasonable degree of certainty. See Marko v. Philadelphia
Trans. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); In re Bradley's Estate, 50 Misc. 2d 72, 269
N.Y.S.2d 657 (Surr. Ct., Nassau County, 1966).
23. 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
24. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 362, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960).
25. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dept. 1953).
26. LADER 148.
27. Hall, Thalidomide and our Abortion Laws, 6 COLUM. UNiv. FORUM 10, 13 (1963);
but see Savel and Perlmutter, Therapeutic Abortion and Sterilization Committee, 80 Am.
J. OBSr. & GYNEC. 1192 (1960): "Since therapeutic abortion results in the destruction oj life
and sterilization prevents the initiation of life, both these procedures must be considered
contrary to ideal medical practice .... ." (Emphasis supplied.)
28. Ratner, supra note 12, at 22.
29. Ibid.
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conception through the nine months of pregnancy to the end of the first
three months of infancy."30
Contraception and abortion are qualitatively different. Contraception
prevents a human life from coming into being; abortion destroys a hu-
man being during "the first year of life."
It seems, however, that Doctor Hall is correct in one respect. When
abortion laws become permissive, contraception (the prevention of life)
and abortion (the destruction of life) tend to become interchangeable as
methods of birth control. Such has been the experience in Japan,3 and
in Hungary, abortion at one time was preferred to contraception simply
because it was cheaper under the national health plan.2 If one were to
ignore all other considerations and restrict his judgment of abortion to
its efficacy as a device for depopulation, one would have to admit that it
does the job.
Is the Life Destroyed by an Abortion a Guilty Life?
The life destroyed by an abortion is a guilty life only if the unborn
child can be considered an aggressor. But "the unborn child simply exists
and grows, passively and without volition, in the womb of its mother. To
say that it is an aggressor, by reason of its physical existence and natural
growth in the place intended for its existence and growth, is to do violence
to meaningful language.,
33
An abortion destroys the life of an innocent human being.
THE LAW OF ABORTION
What Is the Purpose of a Law Inhibiting A bortion?
Abortion was a crime at common law. Blackstone traced it as far back
as Bracton, and attributed its origins to a recognition of the individual's
right to life, "a right inherent by nature in every individual.1 34 It seems,
however, that from the earliest times until the enactment of legislation
in the nineteenth century, the crime was restricted to an abortion which
resulted in the death of a quick-child, since "quickening" was taken to
signify the beginning of human life.35 "Quickening" was also a significant
factor in the original American statutes governing abortion. 6
30. Newsweek, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 36.
31. See CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 150-51 (1958).
32. See Konstek, Observations on Artifically Induced Abortion (1964), abstracted in
93 Amv. J. OBST. & GYiNEc. 592-93 (1965).
33. Kenealy, Law and Morals, 9 CATHoLic LAW. 200, 209 (1963).
34. See 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 129 (2d ed. 1766).
35. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 151-52. But see, Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa.
631 (1850) (holding that an abortion prior to quickening was a common law crime). Even
in the early common law the crime was not denominated murder although it was a homi-
cide. By Blackstone's time, abortion of a quick-child was a "heinous misdemeanor." BLACK-
STONE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 129-30.
36. See Quay, supra note 7, at 435-38.
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Nineteenth century legislation proscribing abortion prior to "quicken-
ing" has been attributed by one author to a desire to promote population
growth,37 while two other writers appear to argue that such laws were
intended for the protection of the mother."8 Applying the theory of the
common law crime (the protection of human life) to current embryology
and genetics (human life begins at conception), we must now regard all
abortion laws as primarily intended for the protection of the unborn
child. In fact, this is the prevailing view. 9
What Is the Present Law?
In 1959, a survey of abortion laws by the American Law Institute re-
vealed that, "In the United States, England, and Canada, the prevailing
pattern is absolute prohibition except for the purpose of saving the
mother's life. Only half a dozen states go so far as to recognize health
as an independent justification."4 °
In New York, an abortion is justified only if it is necessary to preserve
the mother's life." An unjustified abortion at any stage of the pregnancy
is felonious but it is considered homicidal only if the unborn child has
"quickened."42 Although a Pennsylvania statute proscribes as a felony
every unlawful attempt to abort, the word unlawful remains undefined.4 3
It has been argued that this terminology permits of an abortion to
protect the health of the mother even though her life may not be en-
dangered. 4 However, Pennsylvania is not ordinarily listed among those
jurisdictions which sanction an abortion for reasons of health alone. An
unlawful abortion which results in the death of a quick-child is punished
more severely in Pennsylvania than other attempts at abortion. 6
What Changes in the Law Have Been Proposed?
The American Law Institute has proposed the legalization of abortion
if a licensed physician "believes there is a substantial risk that continu-
ance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental
health of the mother or that the child would be born with a grave physi-
cal or mental defect or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest or
37. Moore, Unrealistic Abortion Laws, 1 Ca.m. LAW. BULL. 3, 6 (1965).
38. Leavy and Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws,
35 So. CAL. L. REv. 123, 134 (1962).
39. WmLmms, op. cit. supra note 7, at 149. "[R]espect for human life .. .underlies
the social effort to control abortion ... " MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 158.
40. Id. at 146.
41. N. Y. PEN. LAW. §§ 80, 1050(2).
42. Ibid.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4718. See Note, 34 TEMPLE L.Q. 146, 150 (1961).
44. Leavy and Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52, 54
(1964). On the other hand, the statute may proscribe all abortions. See Trout, Therapeutic
Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMPLE L.Q. 172, 185 (1964).
45. See e.g. the list in Moore, supra note 37, at 3-4.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4719.
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other felonious intercourse [statutory rape] .,47 Most proposals to liberal-
ize state abortion laws have been similarly structured. 8
The American Law Institute has classified abortion as an offense against
the family, thereby belittling the homicidal aspects of the crime. Actually,
no evaluation of abortion legislation is meaningful if it ignores the fact
that an abortion kills an innocent human being.
LIBERALIZATION OF THE LAW: AN EVALUATION IN
GENERAL
Is the Unborn Child an Inferior Being?
For several reasons, the American Law Institute considers the fetus,
at least in the early stages of its life, to be an inferior being:
An attempt to terminate a pregnancy in the later stages prob-
ably calls for special repressive measures because of the greater
danger to the mother and because the respect for human life
which underlies the social effort to control abortion assumes in-
creasing relevance as the fetus passes into the stage of recogniz-
able, viable humanity. 9
There seems to be an obvious difference between terminating the
development of such an inchoate being [less than four months
old], whose chance of maturing is still somewhat problematical,
and, on the other hand, destroying a fully formed viable fetus
of eight months .... 10
The Institute's position on the natural inferiority of the fetus breaks
down as follows:
(a) The fetus is an "inchoate being." The significance of this proposi-
tion has already been discussed.5'
(b) The fetus is not "recognizable" as a human being. It may be
true that in the very early part of the pregnancy the unborn child looks,
as one geneticist put it, "more like a creature from another world than
a human being."52 Yet, as this same geneticist hastened to point out, "In
spite of . . . his appearance, he is a living, striving human being from
the very beginning."5
Like a person whose skin pigment is other than white, the unborn child
is recognizable as a human being simply because he is a human being.
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
48. See LADER 146-47 (discussing proposed legislation in several states).
49. MODEL PENAL CODE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 158.
50. Id. at 149.
51. See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra.
52. AsHLEY MoNrAGu, op. cit. supra note 16, at 2.
53. Ibid.
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His status must be governed by this fact and not by the irrelevancies of
size, shape, and color.
(c) At the time when an abortion takes place, the fetus is not yet
"viable," that is, it is not capable of existence apart from the mother.
Apparently, the unborn child's complete dependence upon his mother
somehow relegates him to an inferior status and justifies a physical as-
sault upon him by way of an abortion. But, "[T]here is no dependence
by the [unborn] child on the mother except for sustenance. It might be
remarked here that even after birth the child depends for sustenance
upon the mother or upon a third party. It is not the fact that an unborn
child is part of the mother, but that rather in the unborn state it lived
with the mother ....
The pre-natal and post-natal child share in common a complete de-
pendence upon others for sustenance. If this dependence justifies an abor-
tion, it should also justify infanticide. Obviously infanticide is not a part
of our public policy. On the other hand, solicitude for the welfare of
children is a part of our public policy. The more dependent and helpless
a person is, the more solicitous the law is of his welfare. Vide the War on
Poverty. In order to insure that the child's helplessness and dependence
will not be used as an excuse for a physical attack upon him, a number of
state legislatures have enacted child-abuse statutes.5 These statutes are
the very antithesis of permissive abortion laws.
(d) Most abortions occur at a time when the fetus' chance of matur-
ing "is still somewhat problematical." The statement is misleading.
Eighty-five per cent of all those pregnancies, which are not deliberately
aborted, proceed to the point of viability. 6 Even if we ignore this statis-
tic, the Institute's position remains untenable. Our law has never recog-
nized the uncertain health of a human being as justification for destroying
him. For instance, it is no defense to a charge of an unlawful homicide,
that the victim was in ill-health and that his chances of surviving for
an appreciable period of time were problematical. 7
The Institute's position seems as alien to medicine as it is to law. 8 At
least, one hopes that the medical profession does not now regard death
as acceptable therapy for uncertain health.
54. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960) (quoting from the
dissenting opinion in Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 466, 26 A.2d 684, 687 (E. & A.
1942); accord, Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dept. 1953).
55. See Hansen, Child Abuse Legislation and the Interdisciplinary Approach, 52
A.BA.J. 734 (1966).
56. A. C. Mietus and Norbert J. Mietus, supra note 17, at 925.
57. See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 85 (1934).
58. See Heffernan and Lynch, What is the Status of Therapeutic Abortion in Modern
Science?, 66 Am. J. OBST. & GYNEC. 335 (1953), and see generally CLFasaNT, THOU SHALT
NOT KILL (1930).
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None of the reasons given by the American Law Institute are sufficient
for classifying unborn children as inferior human beings. Quite the con-
trary, the fallacies inherent in the Institute's position serve to demon-
strate the equality of the unborn child with all other human beings.
Is the Unborn Child Entitled to the Equal Protection of the Law?
If the unborn child is not an inferior human being, ought he not pos-
sess the minimal rights guaranteed to his after-born counterpart? It
would seem so.
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees to every person the equal protection of the law. Of the universality
of this provision, Professor Leonard Manning has written, "The four-
teenth amendment is not limited to the proscription of racial discrimina-
tion. . . .The due process and equal protection clauses . ..protect all
persons of any class or race, whether they be Arab, Japanese, or Chinese,
Jews, Christians or atheists, aliens or citizens, residents or nonresidents,
men or women, individuals or c6rporations."' 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
The equal protection clause has its limitations. By its terms, it applies
only to persons, but the unborn child is a human being and it is difficult
to conceive of a human being who is not a person. Then too, the clause
does not require that things that are different be treated the same. How-
ever, any classification of persons, which results in a difference of treat-
ment, must be rationally conceived. As one constitutional authority has
written of the equal protection clause, vis--vis legislative differentiation
between white and non-white:
It does not require the states to treat all persons identically; the
states may base their laws upon reasonable legislative classifica-
tions, which differentiate between people or groups in different
circumstances. Legislative classification based upon race or color
is, however, lacking in the rational basis that is necessary for
such classification to be sustained. Even if we concede that there
may be differences between the races, can we say that we know
enough, scientifically speaking, about racial differences to con-
clude that classification based on race is other than irrational?
If we are frank, we must admit that racial classification reflects
not objective science, but racial animosity. If the equal protec-
tion clause means what it says, such irrational classification can-
not mount the hurdle of the fourteenth amendment.6° (Empha-
sis added.)
As we have seen, there is no qualitative difference, scientifically speak-
59. Manning, State Responsibility Under the Fourteenth Amendment: An Adherence
to Tradition, 27 FoRnnHA- L. REv. 201, n.4 (1958).
60. SCHWARTZ, Tua SurRa.E COURT 265 (1957).
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ing, between human life in the womb and human life after birth. Hence,
legislation, which would remove the life of a person in the womb from
the full and equal protection of the law, would be as discriminatory, as
"irrational," and as inimical to the equal protection clause as the legis-
lative classification of races. Therefore, to Professor Manning's enumera-
tion of persons under the aegis of the equal protection clause, we may now
add "born or in the womb."
The proposition is not novel. In 1949, an Ohio court found that an
injury wrongfully inflicted upon an unborn child was an injury to his
"person" within the meaning of the state constitution which guarantees
to everyone a remedy by due course of law for an injury done him in
his person.6' In the context of constitutional guarantees, the court was
unable to distinguish injuries to intrauterine and extrauterine persons.
Yet on the ground that he is unborn, the American Law Institute would
permit the ultimate injury, destruction, of a person whose continued
existence threatens the life of no other person, and who is himself inno-
cent of any wrongdoing. Prima facie, the Institute's proposal, if enacted
into law, would violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
A Pennsylvania court arrived at essentially the same conclusion over
one hundred years ago when it observed, in a decision arising out of an
abortion prosecution, "[T]he civil rights of an infant in ventre sa mere
are fully protected at all periods after conception." 2
Should We Devalue the Life of the Unborn Child?
Blackstone placed the innocent person's right to life among the abso-
lute rights of individuals.6" Few would dispute him. Indeed, the sanctity
and inalienability of innocent human life is one of the basic values upon
which our society is structured. To destroy the value is to imperil the
structure.
To illustrate: one writer recently complained that a woman, who is
denied an abortion of a predictably deformed child is "forced to bear a
child against her will, a child whose life may be physically and emo-
tionally blighted, and who may require a lifetime of costly medical
care." 4 But the same is true of a woman who gives birth to a defective
infant. She is forced to rear a child whose life is "blighted" and who
does require costly medical care. Is infanticide the next step after abor-
61. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
It is true that the plaintiff was viable when the injury occurred but viability is irrelevant
in determining the status and, therefore, the rights of the unborn child. See text accompanying
notes 21-25, 54, and 55 supra.
62. Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 633 (1850).
63. BLACKSTONE, op. cit. supra note 34, at 129.
64. LADER 171-72.
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tion? The prospect does not seem quite so improbable when one recalls
that our Judeo-Christian culture is unique in its absolute rejection of
infanticide,6" and that within the lifetime of most of us, the leader of a
purportedly civilized Western nation warned his people "to produce
images of the Lord and not monstrosities halfway between man and
ape."66 Few of us have forgotten the way in which he enforced this
dictum.
Perhaps a society, founded upon a different tradition than our own,
might survive the devaluation of innocent human life. It is doubtful
that we would. At least, we are justified in inquiring of the abortion ad-
vocates: if you would have us dispense with the sanctity of life, what
would you offer us in its stead?
LIBERALIZATION OF THE LAW: AN EVALUATION OF THE
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
Is Abortion Necessary to Protect the Health of the Mother?
Following World War II, the medical profession's outlook on thera-
peutic abortion (i.e., to protect the life of the mother) altered so drasti-
cally that today genuine medical indications for abortion have all but
disappeared.67 Of course, therapeutic abortions are still performed, but
one suspects that many of these are based not on objective medical judg-
ment, but on the "liberal" social tendencies of the hospital involved.6"
These tendencies have found a euphemistic haven in the concept of so-
cial medicine which transforms social and economic disadvantage into
a medical (usually psychiatric) disease. 9 As a result, poverty becomes
an illness and an abortion of a disadvantaged woman becomes thera-
peutic.
Doctor Joseph A. Ryan, Acting Chief of Staff of the District Hospital,
Avenal, California, is one who disagrees that abortion is proper therapy
for socio-economic deprivation:
65. See BATES, THE PREVALENCE OF PEOPLE 102-03 (paperback ed. 1962).
66. Adolph Hitler, quoted in SHIBrsS, THE RISE AND FAL OF THE T al REICH 89
(1960).
67. See SHAW, ABORTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 17-18 (1966); Cosgrove, Therapeutic
Abortion, 55 J. MICH. STATE MED. SOC. 795 (1956); Donnelly, Are There Medical Indica-
tions for Abortion?, 52 J. MED. SoC. or N.J. 112 (1955) ; Heffernan and Lynch, Is Thera-
peutic Abortion Scientifically Justified?, 19 LINACRE Q. 11 (1952).
68. See the exchange between Dr. K. Schaupp and Dr. W. B. Thompson at the 1963
meeting of the Pacific Coast Obstetrical and Gynecological Society, as recorded in 89 Am.
J. OBST. & GYNEC. 353-54 (1964). About 8000 hospital abortions are performed annually in
the United States. LADER 17.
69. Mandy, Reflections of a Gynecologist, in ROSEN, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 284, 295
(1954). For a critical analysis in depth of "psychosocial" medicine, see SZASZ, LAw, LIBERTY
AND PSYCHIATRY 13-17 (1963).
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Psychiatrists are essentially doctors of medicine, not socio-
economic prophets ....
Injustices, delinquency, vandalism and slums do exist. Physi-
cians are helping to solve these problems, but an extension of
laws permitting therapeutic abortion will not eradicate them.
Rather increased energy spent on public housing, good health
care, higher minimum wages, family allowances, the general
raising of the standards of American life-these are legislative
ventures that will help mitigate the nation's deficiencies."
In Sweden, abortions on socio-economic grounds are legal. In 1958,
interviews with 100 Swedish women, who had undergone a legal abortion
prior to giving birth to a child, revealed that none of the later preg-
nancies had been injurious to either health or the ability to function in
society-even though the socio-economic circumstances of half the women
had not changed in the interval between the two pregnancies."
Such statistics do not deter the proponents of permissive abortion. One
of them recently advocated a test case "possibly supported by the Asso-
ciation for the Study of Abortion" to establish the legality of socio-
economic abortion within the existing New York law,72 which, of course,
permits an abortion only when necessary to preserve the life of the
mother.
A medically unnecessary liberalization of the law to include the health
of the mother would open a Pandora's box of social engineering, having
little to do with medical health. We must ask ourselves, therefore,
whether we are prepared to abandon human beings to the moral and so-
cial predilictions of individual doctors, or whether we shall continue to
extend to these persons the equal protection of the law regardless of
their socio-economic status.
Is Eugenic Abortion Justifiable?
Eugenic abortion is the destruction of an unborn child on a prognosis
that the child will be born with a grave physical or mental defect. Those
who favor eugenic abortion argue that a woman ought not be burdened
with a defective child,7" and that such a child is "neither an image nor
likeness of God, but only a grotesque caricature of man. ' 74 Rabbi
70. Ryan, Liberalized Abortion Laws-Immoral and Dangerous, N.Y.L.J., April 19,
1966, p. 4, col. 1. Other doctors have expressed the same thought. See e.g., Donnelly in
CALDERON E, op. cit. supra note 31, at 104; Cavanagh, quoted in SHAw, op. cit. supra note
67, at 33.
71. Aren, Legal Abortion in Sweden (1958), 80 Am. J. OBST. & GYNEc. 615 (1960).
72. LADER 153-54.
73. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
74. Means, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1965, p. 28, col. 4.
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Immanuel Jakobovits made a most effective case against both these posi-
tions not long ago when he wrote, "Human life being infinite in value,
its sanctity is bound to be entirely unaffected by the absence of any or
all mental faculties or by any bodily defects: any fraction of infinity
still remains infinite.
75
The most frequent cause of pre-natal defects is rubella (German
measles) contracted by the mother during the first three months of preg-
nancy.7s An effective vaccine against rubella has already been developed
and is in the testing stage.
Is Abortion of a Rape-Induced Pregnancy Justifiable?
The liberalizers make their strongest case when they point to the
woman impregnated by a rapist. Must she suffer the anguish of carrying
the rapist's child? Does not her right of self-defense against the rapist
also apply to "an embryo which becomes part of the same criminal ag-
gression? '78 Moreover the English case of R. v. Bourne79 is authority for
termination of a rape-induced pregnancy.
All of these arguments are appealing until we remember that the thing
in the womb is a child in the first year of his life; that he is more help-
less at the hands of an abortionist than his mother was at the hands of
the rapist, and that by no stretch of semantics can this innocent, passive
human being be called an aggressor.80
We have a choice in cases of rape-induced pregnancies. We can either
kill the child or we can direct all our ingenuity toward smoothing the way
for both the mother and the child. The latter is the truly humane choice.
ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Is Illegal Abortion a Serious Problem in the United States?
Whether the annual number of illegal abortions in the United States
approaches the frequently quoted figure of 1,200,000 is to be doubted.
75. Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 480, 487 (1965). For a
further discussion of eugenic abortion, see text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
76. See Quay, Justifiable Abortion: Medical and Legal Foundations-Part 1, 49 GEO.
L.J. 173, 238-41 (1960).
77. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1966, p. 45, col. 6. The initial tests have been successful.
N.Y. World Journal Tribune, Sept. 30, 1966, p. 15, col. 1.
78. LADER 172.
79. [1938] 3 All E.R. 615 (K.B.).
80. One must not underestimate the anguish of a woman who has been forcibly im-
pregnated by a rapist. But R. v. Bourne notwithstanding, the law has in the past valued
innocent human life over peace of mind. For instance, in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan
Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964),
a pregnant woman was compelled to submit to a blood transfusion, which was necessary to
save the life of her unborn child, despite her sincere, religiously-rooted abhorrence of
transfusions.
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Certainly the popular estimate of 10,000 maternal deaths a year from
illegal abortions bears no relationship to reality."' Nevertheless, the inci-
dence is high and the problem must be regarded as serious, especially
when one considers that the criminal abortionist, in many cases, is not a
skilled medical practitioner.
The problem is aggravated, as a Grand Jury investigation in New York
revealed,82 by the difficulty in obtaining evidence for an indictment. The
victim, the unborn child, is dead and in many instances, only those who
were parties to the crime are aware that he ever existed. If the mother
dies at the hands of an abortionist, who is also a doctor, a false death
certificate may be issued. If the mother does not die, but is hospitalized,
there still exists the problem of determining whether the miscarriage was
spontaneous or induced. Even then, the doctor-patient privilege may pre-
vent disclosure.83
All this is not to say that an abortion law is unenforceable. Between
1946 and 1953, a concerted effort to obtain convictions by the District
Attorney of New York County resulted in a substantial decline in the
number of criminal abortionists operating in New York City.84
Another aspect of the illegal abortion problem is presented by the
charge that our present laws discriminate against the poor. After all, the
rich are able to fly off to a foreign country where the law is permissive,
while the poor are driven into the clutches of the domestic criminal
abortionist. Dr. Andre Hellegers of The Johns Hopkins University Medi-
cal School has said of this allegation, "I find this argument extraordinary
since it so clearly implies that the wealthy are getting too many abortions.
It is somewhat like saying that if a man is wealthy enough to move to a
Moslem country and marry four wives, we must change the bigamy law
here because the poor are being discriminated against."85
It is also charged that in many hospitals, private patients obtain abor-
tions more easily than ward patients. One reformer attributes this ap-
parent discrimination to "a system that interprets the law one way for
the rich, another for the poor."8 8 Should we conclude from this that the
81. For a detailed analysis of the origins and reliability of these statistics, see Hellegers,
A Doctor Looks at Abortion 19-25 (Edward Douglas White Lecture, Georgetown University,
March 16, 1966).
82. See NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT KINGS COUNTY: A PRESENTNMNT ON THE
SUPPRESSION OF CRIMINAL ABORTION BY THE GRAD JURY FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY SPECIAL
AND TRIAL TERm 5-7 (Hamilton Press, 1941).
83. See People v. McAlpin, 270 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1966).
84. See discussion in CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 36-37 (1958).
85. Hellegers, supra note 81, at 17.
86. LADER 29-30. Dr. Hellegers disputes the charge of discrimination. He points out that
private patients typically come under a doctor's care at an early stage in the pregnancy
when most abortions are performed. Ward patients often do not consult a doctor until it is
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law itself is discriminatory? Or do these statistics merely indicate that
for one reason or another, some doctors are particularly solicitous of the
rich? Problems created by those who abuse the law for personal gain are
not solved by acquiescing in the abuse.
If one were searching for discrimination, he would most certainly find
it in a proposal to permit abortion on socio-economic grounds. Whether
an unborn child were to enjoy the protection of the law would depend on
the wealth of his parents.
Will Any Law Short of Abortion-at-Will Effect a Decrease in the Number
of Illegal Abortions?
Liberalizers sometimes point to Sweden's abortion law as a middle
ground for liberalization. s7 Although the Swedish law is more permissive
than that proposed by the American Law Institute, one liberalizer admits
that it has failed in its purpose of reducing the number of illegal abor-
tions, s" and another asserts that to expect such a law sharply to reduce
criminal abortion is "highly illogical." 9 Actually, there is evidence that
illegal abortion increased in Sweden after the law was liberalized.90
Students of the subject have discovered the reason for the Swedish
debacle. It is simply that liberalization of the law makes abortion more
culturally acceptable.9' Women, who might never have thought of an
abortion, now believe that they have a right to one-even though their
reasons for seeking it may be legally insufficient. The result is an entirely
new (and perhaps larger) clientele for the criminal abortionist.
If the problem of illegal abortion is to be attacked by liberalizing the
law, then as one advocate of permissive abortion has pointed out, we must
be prepared to go all the way-to legalize all abortions.2
Is There an Alternative to A bortion-at-Will?
There is another way to attack the problem of illegal abortion. We,
as lawyers, may choose to become the advocates of the cause of the un-
born child. In this role, we shall argue to the American people, as we
have done before, that differences in size, shape, and color are not valid
too late for an abortion to be performed safely. Moreover, the mental stress of pregnancy
is more severe in the earlier stages and hence, the private patient is liable to be in a much
worse state of mind when she sees a psychiatrist than the ward patient who may have
passed the most difficult period. Hellegers, supra note 81, at 17-18.
87. LADER 117.
88. Hall, Thalidomide and our Abortion Laws, 6 COLUM. UNIV. FORUM 10, 12 (1963).
89. LADER 120.
90. GEBHARD, POMEROY, MARTIN AND CHRISTENSON, PREGNANCY, BIRTH & ABORTION
224 (1958).
91. See authorities quoted in SHAW, op. cit. supra note 67, at 38-40.
92. Rossi, PUBLIC VIEws ON ABORTION 4-6 (1966).
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grounds for taking the life of an innocent human being. We know, of
course, how arduous and uphill such a civil rights battle can be, and
particularly will it be so here because the minority, whose rights are at
stake, is both voiceless and voteless. But in pondering the alternatives,
we might bear in mind what was said in another context by a leader of
the abortion movement in California:
Achieving stability in law is a painfully long-term process of
gradually increasing usage and acceptance .... But law in the
modern age must go further than its traditional role of follow-
ing the mores of the people it serves. It must undertake the role
of leadership and its jurists must continually stress and teach
the rules of conduct to which ... all men must bind themselves
for the survival of mankind.93
Respect for the sanctity of innocent human life may very well be one
of those rules of conduct upon which the survival of mankind depends.
And permissive abortion seems to go a long way toward abrogating the
rule. Perhaps, when all is said and done, respect for the innocent person's
right to life will turn out to be the crucial issue in the abortion contro-
versy, and perhaps, it will be lawyers who have made it so.
93. Leavy, The Eichman Trial and the Role of Law, 48 A.B.A.J. 820, 824 (1962).
1966-19671

